Bank liquidity creation and risk taking during distress by Berger, Allen N. et al.
Bank liquidity creation
and risk taking during distress
Allen N. Berger
(University of South Carolina,
Wharton Financial Institutions Center and CentER – Tilburg University)
Christa H. S. Bouwman






Series 2: Banking and Financial Studies
No 05/2010
Discussion Papers represent the authors’ personal opinions and do not necessarily reflect the views of the
Deutsche Bundesbank or its staff. 
 
 
Editorial Board:   Klaus  Düllmann 
    Frank  Heid 
    Heinz  Herrmann 
















Deutsche Bundesbank, Wilhelm-Epstein-Straße 14, 60431 Frankfurt am Main,  
Postfach  10 06 02, 60006 Frankfurt am Main 
 
Tel +49  69 9566-0 
Telex within Germany  41227, telex from abroad  414431 
 
Please address all orders in writing to: Deutsche Bundesbank, 
Press and Public Relations Division, at the above address or via fax  +49 69 9566-3077 
Internet http://www.bundesbank.de 
Reproduction permitted only if source is stated. 
ISBN  978-3–86558–636–0 (Printversion) 
ISBN  978-3–86558–637–7 (Internetversion) 
 Abstract
Liquidity creation is one of banks’ raisons d’être. But what happens to liquidity creation and 
risk taking when a bank is identified as distressed by regulatory bodies and subjected to regula-
tory interventions and/or receives capital injections? What are the long-run effects of such in-
terventions? To address these questions, we exploit a unique dataset of German universal banks 
for the period 1999 - 2008. Our main findings are as follows. First, regulatory interventions and 
capital injections are followed by lower levels of liquidity creation. The probability of a decline 
in liquidity creation increases to up to around 50 percent when such actions are taken. Second, 
bank risk taking decreases in the aftermath of regulatory interventions and capital injections. 
Third, while banks’ liquidity creation market shares decline over the five years following such 
disciplinary measures, they also reduce their risk exposure over this period to become safer 
banks.
Keywords:     liquidity creation, bank distress, regulatory interventions, capital injections  
JEL Classification:  G21,  G28 Nontechnical summary 
Modern financial intermediation theory emphasizes the role of banks as liquidity creators. 
These theories surmise that liquidity is created by financing relatively illiquid assets with rela-
tively liquid liabilities. In other words, these theories are based upon the concept of positive 
maturity transformation. What is however far from clear is how banks’ ability to create liquid-
ity is affected during episodes of distress. Are there any effects on liquidity creation when regu-
lators and bankers associations intervene into a troubled bank by, inter alia, imposing activity 
restrictions and/or demanding capital restoration measures? What happens to bank risk taking? 
What happens in the years following such measures?  
Answers to these questions are of utmost importance to illuminate and inform the lively de-
bate among academics and policy makers in light of the recent financial crisis because inappro-
priate responses to distress may impede provision of liquidity to the real economy, or, in con-
trast, even foster the creation of dangerous “bubbles”. 
In this study, we exploit a unique dataset of German universal banks for the period 1999-
2008 and use recently-developed measures of liquidity creation to shed light on the connections 
between actions taken during times of bank distress (regulatory interventions and capital injec-
tions), liquidity creation, and risk taking. By focusing on the effects of disciplinary measures on 
liquidity creation instead of examining their effects on lending behavior, our research takes a 
more holistic perspective using a superior concept of bank output that is based on banks’ inter-
mediation capabilities. 
Using two alternative regression techniques, we present three important empirical results. 
First, regulatory interventions and capital injections are associated with less liquidity crea-
tion. Second, these types of interventions also reduce risk taking. These liquidity creation and 
risk taking reducing effects may be desirable since recently bailed out institutions in other 
countries such as Northern Rock in the U.K. and UBS in Switzerland were considered exces-
sive liquidity creators. In this sense, our findings provide some suggestive evidence that regula-
tors and bankers associations can identify banks that may create high levels of liquidity and 
intervene to constrain liquidity creation with the intention to preserve the institution as a going 
concern. Third, liquidity creation market shares decline in the years following these two types 
of interventions and banks further reduce their exposure to credit risk by rebalancing their loan 
portfolios. 
Nichttechnische Zusammenfassung 
 Die moderne Theorie der Finanzintermediation betont die Rolle von Banken zur Bereitstel-
lung von Liquidität für die Realwirtschaft. Diese Theorie besagt, dass Liquidität in den Bankbi-
lanzen durch die Finanzierung von relativ illiquiden Assets mit relativ liquiden Verbindlichkei-
ten geschaffen wird. Mit anderen Worten, die Theorie basiert auf der Idee der positiven Fristen-
transformation. Weitestgehend unbeantwortet ist jedoch die Frage, wie sich es sich mit der Ge-
nerierung von Liquidität in Krisenzeiten – oder auch wenn ein Institut in Schieflage gerät – 
verhält. Welche Wirkung hat ein Eingriff durch die Bankenaufsicht bzw. durch den Banken-
verband (Einlagensicherungsfonds) auf die Liquiditätsgenerierung eines in Schieflage gerate-
nen Instituts? Wie entwickelt sich die Bank-Performance in den Jahren nach einer solchen 
Maßnahme? 
Antworten auf diese Fragen sind von entscheidender Bedeutung in der aktuellen Diskussion 
um die Ursachen und Maßnahmen zur derzeitigen Finanzkrise, da eine unangemessene 
Handhabung der Notlage einer Bank die Bereitstellung von Liquidität für die Realwirtschaft 
erschweren bzw. die Bildung von Spekulationsblasen begünstigen kann.
Diese Studie basiert auf einem Datensatz mit vertraulichen bankenaufsichtlichen Informati-
onen zu deutschen Universalbanken für den Zeitraum 1999 bis 2008. Wir berechnen jüngst 
entwickelte und in der Literatur anerkannte Maße für die Liquiditätsgenerierung von Banken. 
Hierauf aufbauend untersuchen wir das Zusammenwirken von Liquiditätsgenerierung, regula-
torischen Eingriffen und kapitalerhaltenden Maßnahmen, insbesondere im Hinblick auf in 
Schieflage geratene Institute. Die Tatsache, dass wir unsere Studie dabei nicht auf das Kredit-
vergabeverhalten von Banken (sondern auf deren Liquiditätsgenerierung) fokussieren, erlaubt 
eine ganzheitliche Betrachtung, gerade auch im Hinblick auf das Intermediations-Potenzial der 
Institute. Unsere empirischen Ergebnisse stellen sich wie folgt dar: 
Erstens sind bankaufsichtliche Maßnahmen und Kapitalhilfen durch den Einlagensiche-
rungsfonds mit einer verminderten Liquiditätsgenerierung durch die Institute verbunden. Zwei-
tens fahren Banken nach diesen Maßnahmen auch ihre Risikobereitschaft zurück. Diese “dis-
ziplinierenden” Effekte können durchaus wünschenswert sein, da bspw. Institute wie Northern 
Rock (Vereinigtes Königreich) oder UBS (Schweiz) gerade in der Finanzkrise durch eine hohe 
Liquiditätsgenerierung auffällig wurden und schließlich gerettet werden mussten. In diesem 
Sinne deuten unsere Ergebnisse darauf hin, dass Bankenaufseher und Bankenverbände Institute 
mit (zu) hoher Liquiditätsgenerierung identifizieren und mittels Intervention deren Handlungs-
spielraum beschränken, mit dem Ziel, das Institut langfristig zu erhalten. Darüber hinaus zeigen 
wir in Langfrist-Analysen, dass disziplinierende Maßnahmen nicht nur die Liquiditätsgenerie-
rung einschränken, sondern gleichzeitig auch in den fünf Jahren nach der Intervention die Risi-
ken der betroffenen Institute kontinuierlich sinken bzw. deren Kapitalquoten kontinuierlich 
ansteigen.Contents
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Introduction 
Financial intermediation theory suggests that liquidity creation is one of banks’ raisons 
d’être (e.g., Bryant, 1980; Diamond and Dybvig, 1983; Holmstrom and Tirole, 1998, Kashyap 
et al., 2002).
1 Banks’ ability to create liquidity may be hampered during times of distress.  This 
is a primary source of concern because bank distress can negatively affect the overall provision 
of liquidity to the real economy (Bernanke, 1983; Gibson, 1995; Ongena et al., 2003; 
Dell’Ariccia et al., 2008). Distressed banks may be subjected to different types of interventions. 
While regulators primarily focus on reducing risk at such banks in order to preserve them as 
going concerns, their actions may affect bank liquidity creation as well. It is therefore not sur-
prising that issues surrounding bank liquidity creation and risk taking during episodes of stress 
lie at the heart of the discussion of academics, central banks, regulatory authorities, and poli-
cymakers (e.g., Webb, 2000; Acharya et al., 2007, 2009; Bank of England, 2008). However, 
there are many important questions that have yet to be answered. For example, how do regula-
tory interventions and capital injections into distressed banks affect their ability to create li-
quidity? What are the effects of these interventions on risk taking? What are the long-run ef-
fects of such interventions on liquidity creation and risk taking?  
In this paper, we exploit recently-developed measures of liquidity creation that are based 
upon the idea of positive maturity transformation to seek answers to these questions exploiting 
a unique dataset of German universal banks for the period 1999 – 2008. Our research docu-
ments patterns in the data to inform the policy debate on how to deal with distressed institu-
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1   Another key role of banks is to transform risk (e.g., Diamond, 1984; Ramakrishnan and Thakor, 1984; Boyd 
and Prescott, 1986). 
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tions.
2 To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that sheds light on how interventions 
into distressed banks by different parties affect liquidity creation by banks. By focusing on the 
effects of regulatory interventions and capital injections on liquidity creation instead of examin-
ing their effects on lending behavior, our research takes a more holistic perspective using a su-
perior concept of bank output that is based on banks’ intermediation capabilities and includes 
all on- and off-balance sheet activities. Our paper is also related to the studies about prompt 
corrective action and regulator’s closure policies (e.g., Noe et al., 1996; Aggarwal and Jaques, 
2001), and on the effect of capital injections on banks’ lending behavior (e.g., Berrospide and 
Edge, 2009; Giannetti and Simonov, 2009).   
Characteristics of the German financial system make our dataset well-suited for this type of 
analysis. First, Germany has a bank-based financial system, where retail and corporate custom-
ers depend heavily on liquidity provision by financial institutions (Schmidt et al., 1999). Sec-
ond, our dataset from the Deutsche Bundesbank covers the entire universe of German universal 
banks for the period 1999 - 2008. The detailed bank data are combined with the complete set of 
information on interventions by the agencies in charge of regulating and supervising banks. 
Thus, the dataset provides a full overview of how supervisors and bankers associations disci-
pline distressed institutions. Third, Germany offers an interesting experimental setting to exam-
ine these effects because public and cooperative banks (with the exception of the eight Landes-
banks and the two apex institutions of the cooperative banks) operate in geographically delim-
ited areas. These institutions’ markets are the 301 counties that are defined by German law and 
are comparable to average U.S. counties in terms of population and size. Since the industry 
structure in Germany is characterized primarily by small and medium-sized firms that rely al-
most exclusively on bank financing, these borrowers usually are funded via local banks. Fi-
nally, the bank-based financial system in Germany exhibits several similarities to other conti-
nental-European financial systems such as the Austrian, Swiss, Italian, French, and Spanish 
systems in terms of the provision of financial services by many small- and medium-sized banks 
to their customers and in terms of the regulatory and institutional environments. Similarly, in 
the U.S., 98 percent of all banks are considered to be community banks that are the primary 
providers of credit for small and medium sized businesses (Ashcraft, 2001). These community 
banks are locally owned and operated like savings and cooperative banks in Germany. Thus, 
                                                           
2   We refrain, however, from interpreting our findings in a causal sense because we observe patterns of liquidity 
creation only after different types of interventions, but do not observe what the patterns of liquidity creation 
would have been without those events. 
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the empirical regularities we describe below may therefore be broadly representative for a 
number of other countries.  
To address how different forms of interventions affect banks’ ability to create liquidity, we 
regress the percentage change in liquidity creation on variables that provide information on 
whether the regulators intervened (e.g., imposed restructurings, restrictions and prohibitions of 
lending activities), if the banks received capital injections, and a set of control variables. We 
run our analyses for the entire population of banks, estimate the regressions separately for small 
banks (total assets below the median, €566 million) and large banks (total assets above the me-
dian), run the regressions separately for weakly- and better-capitalized banks (split at the me-
dian bank’s balance sheet capital ratio of 5.14 percent), and also estimate the regressions for 
subsamples of crisis years (2001, 2007, and 2008) and non-crisis years.  
By way of preview, we find robust evidence that regulatory interventions and capital injec-
tions are associated with declines in liquidity creation. These two forms of interventions in-
crease the probability of contractions in liquidity creation by 48 and 44 percent, respectively. 
When we split the sample into large and small banks, we show that capital injections are effec-
tive for both. However, regulatory interventions are only effective for small institutions. This 
result is driven by the fact that many of these interventions resemble restructuring orders that 
large banks are better able to accommodate than their smaller counterparts due to their greater 
resources and flexibility in meeting regulatory requirements. The results for the subsample of 
weakly-capitalized institutions do not differ substantially from the results for the full sample. 
Better-capitalized banks, however, do not experience contractions in liquidity creation after 
regulatory interventions, but liquidity creation decreases after capital injections. When we dis-
tinguish between crisis and non-crisis years, we find that both types of interventions have at 
best only limited effects on liquidity creation during crisis years.
One potential concern is that our analyses may merely capture a ‘bad’ bank effect on liquid-
ity creation. Distressed banks may contract their business activities because they are in distress 
and the resulting contraction in liquidity creation would have also taken place absent interven-
tion. To deal with this issue, we run regressions in which we exclude those banks that exit the 
market via restructuring mergers, distress mergers, and banks that were granted a moratorium 
or had their charter revoked. We find that liquidity creation also decreases after regulatory in-
terventions and capital injections when ‘bad’ banks are excluded from the regressions, suggest-
ing that our results are not driven by a ‘bad’ bank effect. 
3 
One key reason why regulators intervene in distressed banks is to reduce risk taking. We 
therefore also examine whether the goal of disciplining events to reduce bank risk is achieved. 
For this purpose, we regress the change in bank risk on the variables that capture regulatory 
interventions and capital injections plus controls. We use two alternative risk measures: the 
total risk-based capital ratio and the nonperforming loan ratio. We find that the different types 
of discipline generally achieve the desired objective of reducing risk taking.
We also examine what happens to liquidity creation and risk taking in the long run. To cap-
ture these effects, we focus on the change in banks’ liquidity creation market shares and the 
change in risk taking relative to the industry five years after such interventions. Banks also 
generally reduce their risk taking behavior over the five years after interventions. Our analysis 
shows that nonperforming loans decrease after both types of interventions and that the total 
risk-based capital ratio increases over the five years after capital injections. These results high-
light that the actions taken by regulators and bankers associations contribute to restoring dis-
tressed institutions’ financial positions to ensure that these banks can remain in business as go-
ing concerns.
We organize the article as follows: Section 1 provides a brief overview of the German bank-
ing sector and the dataset. Section 2 presents the calculation of our measures of liquidity crea-
tion, followed by a discussion of the different types of discipline, and an outline of our hy-
potheses in Section 3. Section 4 presents the methodology. We report our main results in Sec-
tion 5. In Section 6, we examine the robustness of our main results and also disentangle con-
tractions in liquidity creation from a ‘bad’ bank effect. In addition, in this section we also ex-
amine whether interventions and capital injections reduce bank risk. Section 7 discusses the 
long-run effects of different types of interventions, and concluding remarks are offered in Sec-
tion 8.
1. Institutional background and data 
The German banking sector consists of three pillars: private banks, public sector banks, and 
credit cooperatives. While all these banks are universal banks, the three pillars are different in 
terms of ownership structures (Brunner et al., 2004). The pillar of private banks consists of the 
large banks, regional banks, and branches and subsidiaries of foreign banks. The larger private 
banks are organized as joint-stock companies whereas their smaller counterparts are partner-
ships, private limited companies or even sole proprietors. The public sector banks include sav-
ings banks and Landesbanks that are owned by governments on the city-, county-, or state-
4 
level. The cooperative banking pillar comprises cooperative banks and central credit coopera-
tives. These banks are organized in the form of mutuals. Additional details about these different 
types of institutions, in particular with respect to geographical reach and type of business ac-
tivities are provided in Altunbas et al. (2001).
3
We obtain annual data for all these banks that operate in Germany between 1999 and 2008 
from the Deutsche Bundesbank. We exclude banks from the analysis if they i) have no loans 
outstanding, ii) have zero deposits, iii) have unused commitments that exceed 4 times total as-
sets, iv) if they have balance sheet items with negative values, and v) if their total assets are 
below € 25 million. Our dataset has 10,205 bank-year observations for 2,019 banks, of which 
195 are private banks, 550 belong to the public banking sector, and 1,274 institutions are in the 
cooperative sector.
During the sample period, the banking sector experienced a consolidation wave. For our 
analysis it is important to identify mergers, as otherwise there would be unexplained spikes in 
liquidity creation. There are several possible ways to treat mergers:
4 (1) excluding merged 
banks, (2) merging banks ‘backwards’ into one institution over the entire time period, or (3) 
creating a new institution after the merger. The first option leads to loss of information as sev-
eral mergers took place during the sample period. Furthermore, a bias would be created as a 
large fraction of the mergers are classified as ‘distressed mergers,’ i.e., dropping these banks 
would also mean dropping a large share of the most troubled institutions. The second option 
would be based upon the assumption that banks do not change their behavior over time, i.e., 
they behave as one entity prior to the merger and do not change their behavior following the 
merger. For our analysis we choose the third option, and create a new institution after two 
banks merge. This causes the number of banks in our sample to increase as we have three inde-
pendently treated banks: the two pre-merger banks and the post-merger bank.
5
                                                           
3   The large private banks tend to operate national branch office networks, whereas smaller private banks operate 
in local or regional markets. Savings banks operate in locally delimited areas. They are linked to Landesbanks 
in three ways. First, Landesbanks are partially owned by savings banks and, second, they provide wholesale 
services to savings banks. Third, Landesbanks offer services to the savings banks’ customers that the local sav-
ings banks are not able to provide, e.g., international banking and securities business. Cooperative banks also 
operate in local banking markets. The central credit cooperatives are owned by the local cooperative banks. 
The key task of the central cooperatives is similar to the role of Landesbanks for the savings banks. 
4   For a detailed description of possible merger treatment procedures, see Merkl and Stolz (2006). 
5   Mergers account for 7.5 percent of all observations in our sample, and repeated mergers account for 1.5 percent 
of all observations.  
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2. Bank liquidity creation 
To construct our measure of liquidity creation, we employ the three–step procedure devel-
oped by Berger and Bouwman (2009a).  
In the first step, we classify bank assets, liabilities, and equity as liquid, semi-liquid, or illiq-
uid based on the ease, cost, and time it takes for customers to withdraw liquid funds from the 
bank, and the ease, cost and time it takes for a bank to dispose of their obligations to meet these 
liquidity demands. We follow a similar principle for off-balance sheet items. 
A key difference between our calculation of liquidity creation and the approach in Berger 
and Bouwman (2009a) exists. They argue that activities should be classified based on informa-
tion on both product category and maturity. However, due to data limitations, Berger and 
Bouwman (2009a) ultimately classify loans according to either category or maturity. The 
unique database from the Bundesbank, however, enables us to exploit information on both loan 
category and maturity when classifying these items.
6
In the second step, we assign weights of either +½, 0, or -½ to all bank activities that are 
classified in the previous step. The weights are consistent with liquidity creation theory, which 
states that liquidity is created when banks transform liquid liabilities into illiquid assets, 
whereas liquidity is destroyed when liquid assets are financed by illiquid liabilities or equity. 
Hence, we allocate positive weights to illiquid assets and liquid liabilities, while negative 
weights are applied to liquid assets and illiquid liabilities and equity. We apply the intermediate 
weight of 0 to semi-liquid assets and liabilities, based on the assumption that semi-liquid activi-
ties fall halfway between liquid and illiquid activities. In terms of off-balance sheet items, we 
follow Berger and Bouwman (2009a) and apply positive weights to all illiquid guarantees. We 
provide simple examples of liquidity creation in Table 1. 
[Table 1 Liquidity Creation: Examples]
In the third step, we combine the activities as classified and weighted in the first two steps to 
obtain two liquidity creation measures. ‘Mat Cat Fat’ represents our classification of activities 
based on both maturity and category with the inclusion of off-balance sheet activities. ’Mat Cat 
                                                           
6    Another difference is that Berger and Bouwman’s (2009) preferred measure includes the gross fair values of 
off-balance sheet derivatives. Since only notional amounts are available in the Bundesbank database and since 
derivatives affect liquidity creation only marginally in the U.S., we exclude derivatives from our measure of li-
quidity creation. This exclusion should not have a large effect since most banks operate with close to matched 
books. 
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Nonfat’ excludes off-balance sheet activities. The calculation of both measures is illustrated in 
Table 2. 
 [Table 2 Classification of bank activities and construction of liquidity creation measures]
We briefly explore how liquidity creation has evolved from 1999 to 2008 and further inves-
tigate how it varies across different types of banks. Assessing liquidity creation by ‘Mat Cat 
Fat’ (our preferred measure) and ‘Mat Cat Nonfat’ reveals similar trends over time. However, 
the level of liquidity created by banks doubles when we include off-balance sheet activities 
(Figure 1), a finding that is similar to the U.S. Since banks create a substantial amount of li-
quidity off the balance sheet we focus on ‘Mat Cat Fat’ in the rest of the paper. All our meas-
ures of liquidity creation are expressed in real 2000 € terms using the GDP deflator.  
Based on our preferred measure ‘Mat Cat Fat,’ we find that liquidity creation increased 
sharply at the beginning of the period before it peaked in 2001 and began to decline steadily 
thereafter. Liquidity creation rose again from 2004 onwards whereby it reached the highest 
level of approximately € 1.4 trillion in 2006. The financial crisis that began in 2007 coincided 
with a massive plunge in liquidity creation. The level of aggregate liquidity creation at the end 
of the period is lower than at the beginning of our sample period. Banks created around € 1.014 
trillion of liquidity in 1999, compared with € 0.875 trillion in 2008. An examination of the me-
dian bank’s liquidity creation in Table 3, however, suggests that the median bank’s liquidity 
creation increased from € 60 million in 1999 to € 155 million in 2008, we obtain a similar pic-
ture when we investigate liquidity creation divided by total assets (increases from 22 percent to 
over 25 percent).
7
[Table 3 Liquidity Creation in Germany]
[Fig. 1 Liquidity creation: Mat Cat Nonfat and Mat Cat Fat]
Figure 1 presents the breakdown of liquidity creation for the three different types of banks 
and for the full sample. Public banks on average create the most liquidity, followed by coopera-
tive banks, and private banks.
3. Overview of disciplinary actions and formulation of hypotheses  
This section first discusses the possible actions taken by supervisors and bankers associa-
tions. Next, it formulates hypotheses to be tested. 
                                                           
7   The increase in liquidity creation for the median bank is due to the fact that banks grew considerably during 
the sampling period. This growth is, at least partially, due to extensive merger activities in the banking sector.  
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3.1. Actions by supervisors and bankers associations 
Supervision of banks in Germany is the joint responsibility of the Federal Financial Supervi-
sory Authority (“Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht”) and the German central 
bank (“Deutsche Bundesbank“). While the Bundesbank is primarily in charge of the on-site and 
off-site supervision, the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority is the responsible institution 
for all mandatory measures taken against banks.  
Based on financial statement data, audit reports, and on-site examinations, the Bundesbank 
collects information about individual banks’ operations and their financial positions. When 
banks violate the principles of the Banking Act,
8 the Bundesbank forwards this information to 
the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority. The actions by the Federal Financial Supervisory 
Authority depend on the severity of the recorded violations.  In case of minor violations, it may 
intensify supervision or issue warnings and conduct hearings of the bank’s board of directors. If 
the violations are more serious, it may take actions such as issuing sanctions like prohibiting 
the origination of new loans, dismissing senior executives, or, in the worst instances, forcing 
distress mergers, imposing moratoria, or revoking the charter. Before any one of those active 
interventions into the bank’s business activities takes place, the Federal Financial Supervisory 
Authority typically gives the bank time to correct the deficiencies by issuing a warning letter.
Our empirical tests focus on the (serious) sanctions by the regulator that affect the banks’ 
scope of business activities and on capital injections (to be discussed next). We do this because 
banks’ ability to create liquidity is only affected when measures are taken that constitute an 
active intrusion into business operations. In contrast, it is hard to construe arguments that mere 
warning letters and intensified supervision have significant effects on liquidity creation.
9
In addition to the formal regulatory interventions, the respective banking pillar’s bankers as-
sociations operate a tightly-knit framework of support schemes that provide assistance to dis-
tressed institutions (Brunner et al., 2004). The support schemes not only insure the deposits of 
customers but also offer support in the form of capital injections operated by the bankers asso-
ciations that aim to allow for independent recovery and avoid disruptions of confidence in the 
                                                           
8 The Banking Act is the statutory banking supervision guide for banks in Germany.  
9    In unreported regressions, we confirm that liquidity creation is not affected when weak measures are adminis-
tered by the Federal Financial Services Supervisory Agency. The results are available from the authors upon 
request.  
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system that would arise from bank closures.
10 While the private banks’ deposit insurance 
scheme only offers one layer of protection, the support schemes for public and cooperative sec-
tor banks are particularly far reaching to ensure swift recapitalizations. That is, these institu-
tions are part of insurance schemes that offer several layers of protection. For instance, Landes-
banks are not only part of the security reserve system of all other Landesbanks but also of the 
protection system that consists of twelve other regional protection systems of the savings 
banks. In other words, thirteen protection systems are readily available to replenish distressed 
public banks’ capital. In the unlikely case that one layer’s funds are exhausted, the other protec-
tion systems will fill the gap. Similar arrangements exist in the cooperative banking sector. 
While regulatory interventions are normally not known to the public, the capital restoration 
measures are usually reported in the banks’ financial statements.  Two things are important for 
our study.  First, bankers associations are aware of interventions by regulators at an early stage, 
and vice versa.  Second, there is no predetermined ordering with respect to the timing of when 
regulatory interventions and capital injections by bankers associations take place. That is, capi-
tal injections may precede or follow regulatory interventions, and one may also occur without 
the other.
3.2. Regulatory interventions and capital injections 
We use a dummy variable Regulatory interventions into banks to capture actions by the 
regulator. The variable takes on the value one if one of the following six measures was im-
posed.
(1) Restructuring order 
(2) Restrictions or prohibition of lending activities 
(3) Restrictions or prohibition of deposit taking
(4) Restriction or prohibition of deposit withdrawals
(5) Restriction or prohibition of profit distributions 
(6) Dismissal of senior executives
11
                                                           
10   Recapitalizations of distressed banks are common in many countries. Oshinsky and Olin (2006) document that 
U.S. banks often receive capital assistance from their holding companies, and Giannetti and Simonov (2009) 
offer a detailed analysis of recapitalizations of banks during the crisis in Japan in the 1990s.  
11  We include measures against senior executives because these individuals determine the key funding and in-
vestment decisions of a bank, which have important effects on liquidity creation. The corporate finance litera-
ture argues that changing the figurehead is frequently associated with changes in corporate policies (e.g., 
Weisbach, 1988). Dismissals of senior executives account for 6.9 percent of the regulatory interventions in our 
sample. Re-running our regressions based on a regulatory intervention dummy that excludes the dismissals of 
senior executives does not materially change our inferences.  
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We capture Capital injections by the respective bankers associations with a dummy vari-
able. Such capital restoration measures constitute interventions, as they underscore that manda-
tory capital levels have been violated and require active subsidizations. The majority of capital 
injections is observed in cooperative banks, followed by public and private banks.
Due to data confidentiality, we cannot disclose details of the different types of interventions 
and confine the overview to a breakdown by bank types and size in Table 4.
3.3. Formulation of hypotheses 
We expect that regulatory interventions have a negative effect on liquidity creation as they 
(i) identify banks which are under severe distress, and (ii) constitute active interventions into 
the banks’ operations that are likely to impede the scope and scale of their activities with ad-
verse effects for their ability to create liquidity.  We coin our first hypothesis the “Regulatory 
Discipline” Hypothesis. 
H1. Regulatory Discipline Hypothesis: Regulatory interventions limit banks’ scope for 
business activities which is reflected in contractions in liquidity creation.
The theoretical literature poses opposite views on how capital injections will affect liquidity 
creation. Some posit that bank capital may impede liquidity creation because it makes the 
bank’s capital structure less fragile (e.g., Diamond and Rajan, 2000, 2001)
12 or because it 
‘crowds out’ deposits (e.g., Gorton and Winton, 2000). We refer to these collectively as the 
‘financial fragility-crowding out’ theories. Others focus on banks’ role as risk transformers – 
they argue that liquidity creation exposes banks to risk (Allen and Santomero, 1998; Allen and 
Gale, 2004), and that higher capital improves banks’ ability to absorb risk (e.g., Bhattacharya 
and Thakor, 1993; Repullo, 2004; von Thadden, 2004; Coval and Thakor, 2005), so higher 
capital ratios may allow banks to create more liquidity. We refer to these collectively as the 
‘risk absorption’ theories. The ‘financial fragility-crowding out’ theories predict that liquidity 
creation will decrease after capital injections, while the ‘risk absorption’ theories predict that it 
will increase. Note, however, that both effects may be at play. This implies that our tests will 
pick up the net effect of capital injections on liquidity creation.  
 We formulate two hypotheses which we refer to as the ‘Capital Injection Financial Fragil-
ity-Crowding Out’ Hypothesis and the ‘Capital Injection Risk Absorption’ Hypothesis.
                                                           
12  A fragile capital structure encourages the bank to commit to monitoring its borrowers, and hence allows it to 
extend loans. Additional equity capital makes it harder for the less-fragile bank to commit to monitoring, 
which in turn hampers the bank’s ability to create liquidity.   
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H2a. Capital Injection Financial Fragility-Crowding Out Hypothesis: Liquidity creation 
decreases after capital injections. 
H2b. Capital Injection Risk Absorption Hypothesis: Liquidity creation increases after 
capital injections. 
Since regulators intervene to reduce undue risk taking, we expect that risk declines after 
regulatory interventions. Capital injections by bankers associations should directly reduce risk 
both because higher capital ratios have a greater risk-absorption capacity and because they re-
duce moral hazard incentives.
13 We refer to the third hypothesis as the ‘Risk’ Hypothesis. 
H3. Risk Hypothesis: Interventions are associated with reductions in risk taking.
Table 4 provides details about the distribution of interventions the banks experienced be-
tween 1999 and 2008. In our large sample consisting of 10,205 bank-year observations, we 
record 57 regulatory interventions and 364 capital injections.
[Table 4 Interventions and Capital Injections]
4. Methodology
To investigate how liquidity creation changes when interventions by regulators and bankers 
associations take place, we model changes in liquidity creation as a function of regulatory in-
terventions, capital injections, (see Section 3.3), and a set of control variables as detailed fur-
ther below (see Section 4.2).
We run the regressions in changes rather than levels because this allows us to observe how 
changes in our explanatory variables lead to a change in liquidity creation at one particular 
bank in the subsequent year and avoids that our results are driven by cross-sectional variation 
in the data. All explanatory variables are lagged by one period.
A straightforward approach to modeling changes in liquidity creation would be to use ordi-
nary least squares regressions. One potential drawback of using this technique is that our 
documented results could be merely driven by small changes in the dependent variable. It 
would not allow us to differentiate among sizeable increases, sizeable decreases, and constant 
levels of liquidity creation even though we are interested in examining whether different types 
of discipline give rise to substantial fluctuations in liquidity creation. We therefore employ or-
                                                           
13  While we expect that the two types of interventions are effective in reducing risk, it is also possible that risk 
will continue to increase, possibly leading to the ultimate failure of these institutions. 
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dered logit and partial proportional odds models (explained below) in which our dependent 
variable takes on the value of 1 if the bank experienced a drop in liquidity creation in € terms 
(see Table 2 for the construction of liquidity measures) relative to the previous year by more 
than 3 percent. It takes on the value 2 if liquidity creation remained stable within a narrow band 
of +/- 3 percent change, and it takes on the value 3 if liquidity creation increased by more than 
3 percent. In robustness test, we use alternative cut-offs as detailed further below.
4.1. Ordered logit and partial proportional odds models 
Our first model is an ordered logit model.  Ordered logit models express the probability P
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where i X  is the vector of independent variables for bank i, and α and β  are the parameters 
of interest. The parameters  j α  are the cut-off parameters for the different nodes of the depend-
ent variable, i.e.,  1 α  is the intercept for a drop in liquidity creation by more than 3 percent,  2 α
is the intercept for liquidity creation remaining within +/- 3 percent, and  3 α  is the intercept for 
increases in liquidity creation by more than 3 percent; β  are the slope coefficients for the ex-
planatory variables (i.e.., regulatory interventions and capital injections).  
The ordered logit model makes an important ‘parallel odds’ assumption. It assumes that only 
the cut-off parameters  j α  are different across the changes in liquidity creation, whereas the 
slope coefficients of the link function for the parameters of interest remain identical. In the con-
text of our study, this means that interventions are assumed to have an equiproportionate effect 
on the probabilities of either increases or decreases in liquidity creation.  
There are fundamental reasons for why this ‘parallel odds’ assumption may be inappropriate 
when studying the effect of interventions on bank liquidity creation and risk taking during dis-
tress. Take, for example, a regulator that imposes limits on a distressed bank’s ability to lend. 
Such a regulatory intervention is likely to impede liquidity creation. In contrast, it is difficult to 
imagine that such regulatory intervention increases liquidity creation. Similar lines of reasoning 
can be adopted for capital injections. It is therefore important to also test our hypotheses using 
a more flexible approach that does not make such strong assumptions. The so-called partial 
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proportional odds model (Williams, 2006) is a more flexible model: it allows for varying inter-
cepts as well as for different slope coefficients so that 
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The partial proportional odds model resembles a series of simple logit models that bunch 
several ordered dependent variable categories into one. Specifically, we use  3 = M  in our pa-
per.  This means that for  1 = j , category 1 (drop in liquidity creation by more than 3 percent) is 
contrasted with categories 2 and 3 (constant liquidity creation and an increase in liquidity crea-
tion by more than 3 percent, respectively); for  2 = j , the contrast is between categories 1 and 2 
versus category 3. Another benefit of the partial proportional odds model is that it allows test-
ing for the proportional odds assumption. Prior to embarking on our empirical analysis, we dis-
cuss the control variables.  
4.2. Control variables 
Our analyses include control variables that are measured in changes.  For ease of exposition, 
however, we discuss these variables below in levels. 
Real Total assets is included to account for bank size. We control for bank capitalization, 
using the Equity ratio (equity capital to total assets) because Berger and Bouwman (2009a) 
have shown that bank capital is a key determinant for liquidity creation. We use Return on 
equity to control for profitability.  
The Nonperforming loans ratio (nonperforming loans to total loans) accounts for the asset 
quality of the bank. We include this variable to control for bank risk taking. The Loan concen-
tration index, measured as a Herfindahl-Hirschman index of lending activities across 15 indus-
try sectors, controls for concentration in banks’ lending activities.
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We use the number of bank branches to control for the Geographical reach of the banks’ in-
termediation activities. Our rationale for including this variable is that a dense branch office 
network allows a bank to intermediate more funds. The reason is that in Germany, as high-
lighted in the introduction, most firms rely heavily on banks as providers of financial services 
and credit markets are local in nature.   
Real GDP per capita growth on the county level is used to control for differences in local 
economic development.  We include the Interest rate spread (difference between 10 year and 1 
year government bonds) to control for the macroeconomic environment. Since the interest rate 
spread affects bank liquidity creation directly, we prefer using this as a control variable instead 
of including year dummies.  
To account for different bank types, we also include the dummy variables Public bank, Co-
operative bank, or Private bank. We omit the dummy for private banks to avoid perfect collin-
earity.
We present summary statistics of the control variables in Table 5. Panel A presents the sta-
tistics for the full sample, and Panels B and C show a detailed breakdown for the banks that 
experienced regulatory interventions and capital injections, respectively. While the regressions 
are run in changes, we present the summary statistics in levels to facilitate interpretation. A 
number of interesting characteristics of the banks stand out. Institutions in which the regulator 
intervened (Panel B) are considerably smaller than banks that received capital injections. Panel
C underscores the poor performance of banks that had capital restoration measures imple-
mented (average return on equity of -3.14 percent before the intervention) and these banks also 
suffer from high levels of nonperforming loans (on average 17.1 percent before the interven-
tion).
[Table 5 Summary Statistics for Control Variables]
5. Main Results 
This section examines what happens with liquidity creation after regulatory interventions 
and capital injections (Hypotheses 1 and 2). First, we offer a brief analysis of the determinants 
of regulatory interventions and capital injections.
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5.1. The drivers of regulatory interventions and capital injections 
Casual inspection of the descriptive statistics in Table 5 indicates that institutions that are 
subject to regulatory interventions and capital injections are bad performers and suffer from 
poor asset quality. To establish which factors drive interventions more formally, we use a mul-
tinomial logit model whereby the dependent variable takes on the value 0 if neither one of those 
two measures was observed, it takes on the value 1 if the regulators intervened, and it takes on 
the value 2 if the respective bankers association demanded capital restoration measures.
15 We 
use a similar set of explanatory variables as discussed in Section 4.2, except that these variables 
are now expressed in levels rather than changes. In addition, we include a dummy variable Dis-
tress awareness that takes on the value 1 if the regulator or the bankers association was already 
aware of some impending distress in these banks in the periods prior to a regulatory interven-
tion or a capital injection.
16
We approximate this awareness using information on whether an official warning letter was 
sent to the bank and if hearings have been held between bank staff and the regulatory authority 
or the bankers association with respect to dismissals of senior staff or business conduct. This 
dummy variable is also set to 1 in instances when the regulator or the bankers association have 
officially notified the bank of their disapproval of the business conduct, and when officials or 
the bank have been fined by the regulators. Furthermore, we also include a dummy variable 
‘Bad’ bank that takes on the value one if the bank exited the market via a distress merger, or if 
a moratorium was imposed, or if the bank charter was revoked in that period. All explanatory 
variables are lagged by one period in these tests.  
The results in Table 6 underscore that poorly capitalized institutions, institutions with low 
return on equity, and institutions with high levels of nonperforming loans are more likely to be 
subject to regulatory interventions and capital injections. We also find that distress awareness is 
a strong predictor for regulatory interventions but not for capital injections, whereas the bad 
bank dummy is a good predictor for both regulatory interventions and capital injections. A 
buoyant macroeconomic environment reduces the odds for being subject to either regulatory 
                                                           
15  In unreported tests, we examine banks that experience both regulatory interventions and capital injections. 
Our findings about the determinants are virtually unchanged. The results can be obtained upon request.  
16  Bankers associations are aware of impending distress in the institutions because all three types of banks are 
normally audited by representatives of the respective banking associations due to the mandatory membership 
in the respective banking pillar’s deposit protection scheme. Bankers associations therefore engage in surveil-
lance activities and are consequently well aware of the actions taken by the Federal Financial Supervisory 
Authority and the central bank.  
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interventions or capital injections, and public banks are less likely to experience such interven-
tions than private banks.
In sum, these tests provide some preliminary evidence that both regulators and bankers asso-
ciations are able to identify distressed banks that ultimately need further assistance.  
5.2. Main liquidity creation results 
Table 7 presents the results of our ordered logit and the less restrictive partial proportional 
odds models, whereby the regressions are run with changes in liquidity creation as dependent 
variable.  As indicated above, we measure these changes as a drop in liquidity creation of at 
most -3 percent, constant liquidity creation (i.e., a drop up to -3 percent or an increase up to 3 
percent) and an increase in liquidity creation of at least 3 percent. 
 [Table 7 Ordered Logit and Partial Proportional Odds Models – Full Sample]
The results in Table 7 highlight several important empirical patterns. We first focus on the 
ordered logit regressions reported in Column (1), which views increases and decreases in li-
quidity creation in a symmetric way and yields only one coefficient for each variable.   
For ease of interpretation, we report odds ratios which are obtained by exponentiating the 
original coefficients. An odds ratio of one for a regulatory intervention indicates that the prob-
ability of observing an increase or a decrease in liquidity creation is equally likely. An odds 
ratio smaller than one suggests that the regulatory intervention is associated with a lower prob-
ability for an increase in liquidity creation. In contrast, an odds ratio above one indicates that 
the regulatory intervention is associated with a higher chance of increases in liquidity creation. 
First, regulatory interventions are significantly associated with declines in liquidity creation.  
Specifically, the odds ratio of 0.59 indicates that the probability of observing an increase in 
liquidity creation is reduced by 41 percent in case of regulatory interventions. This is consistent 
with the Regulatory Discipline Hypothesis and suggests that measures such as restrictions of 
deposit taking and prohibitions of lending activities impede these banks’ abilities to intermedi-
ate funds and show up in lower levels of liquidity creation.
Second, liquidity creation declines after capital injections. Capital injections reduce the 
probability of an increase in liquidity creation by 31 percent (odds ratio 0.69). This finding 
suggests that the Capital Injection Financial Fragility-Crowding Out Hypothesis empirically 
dominates the Capital Injection Risk Absorption Hypothesis. However, it is important to note 
16 
that injections in capital may come with explicit or implicit demands on banks to reduce risk, 
for example through portfolio adjustments, and these demands may have (possibly inadver-
tently) reduced liquidity creation.  
Note that our analysis here focuses on the short-run effects. In the short run, the liquidity re-
ducing effects may not necessarily be bad. Recall that regulators and bankers associations aim 
to preserve distressed institutions as going concern by reducing risk. Since liquidity creation 
involves risk, a temporary decline in liquidity creation may be needed to turn the banks around. 
In Section 7, we examine the long-run effects.   
The results presented above are based on the ordered logit model, which views increases and 
decreases in liquidity creation in a symmetric way. To examine whether the slope coefficients 
differ, we turn to the partial proportional odds model, which breaks the regressions into two 
parts, and thereby allows for varying effects of the regressors over the different outcomes of the 
dependent variable. Specifically, the regressions in Column (2) capture the effect of the regres-
sors on the probability of observing a drop in liquidity creation versus no change or an increase 
in liquidity creation combined; the coefficients in Column (3) express the effect of the regressor 
on the probability of a drop or no change in liquidity creation relative to an increase liquidity 
creation.
We again show odds ratios for ease of interpretation. In the partial proportional odds models, 
an odds ratio of exactly one suggests that the probability of an increase in liquidity creation is 
equally likely as a contraction or no change in liquidity creation. An odds ratio below one for 
regulatory interventions indicates that the probability for a drop in liquidity creation increases 
relative to observing no change or an increase in liquidity creation, whereas an odds ratio above 
one shows that regulatory interventions go hand in hand with increases in liquidity creation. 
When we allow for varying coefficients across different outcomes, we obtain similar results 
for regulatory interventions and capital injections. The parameter estimates reveal no differ-
ence. To formally examine the proportional odds assumption for the coefficients being held 
constant, we use a Wald test and find that our model does not violate this assumption.  In the 
rest of the paper, we will continue to report the results based on both models, because at times 
we do find different results. In these cases, we view the results based on the proportional odds 
model as more accurate. 
Among the control variables, we find that size, higher capitalization, higher GDP per capita 
growth, and a greater interest rate spread increase the odds of increases in liquidity creation. 
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Relative to private banks, cooperative banks and public banks are also more likely to observe 
increases in liquidity creation. In contrast, riskier and more concentrated loan portfolios de-
crease the odds of greater liquidity creation.   
We evaluate the economic significance of our findings by computing predicted probabilities 
for declines in liquidity creation as a function of different types of discipline. To this end, we 
examine how changing the dummy variables for regulatory interventions and capital injections 
from 0 to 1 affects the probability of observing declines in liquidity creation by at least 3 per-
cent (all other variables are held constant at their mean). These predicted probabilities are based 
on Column (1) in Table 7.     
The unconditional probability of a reduction in liquidity creation is 36 percent for the full 
sample. When we set the dummy for regulatory interventions to 1, the probability of a decline 
in liquidity creation increases to 48 percent after regulatory interventions and to 44 percent af-
ter capital injections. These results highlight that the actions taken by regulators and bankers 
associations affect banks’ potential to engage in liquidity creation substantially.   
5.3. Do the liquidity creation effects differ by bank size? 
In the previous regressions, we controlled for bank size by including total assets (log) as a 
regressor. It is known, however, that banks of different size classes have fundamentally differ-
ent balance sheet compositions (Berger et al., 2005) and that this affects the amount of liquidity 
created by these banks (Berger and Bouwman, 2009a, 2009b). Research also shows that capital 
and monetary policy have different effects on liquidity creation by bank size class (Berger and 
Bouwman, 2009a, 2010). It is important to understand whether regulatory interventions and 
capital injections also have different effects when we split banks into different size classes. To 
investigate this, we split our sample using the median bank size (€566 million) as a cut-off 
point and re-run our regressions. We constrain the subsequent discussion to the key variables of 
interest.  
[Table 8 Ordered Logit and Partial Proportional Odds Model - Small and Large Banks]
Table 8, Panel A, shows the results for the small banks. The results for small banks are gen-
erally consistent with our full sample results: regulatory interventions and capital injections 
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have a liquidity decreasing effect, although the findings are somewhat weaker in terms of their 
statistical significance.
17
Panel B depicts somewhat different results for the large institutions. We continue to find a 
liquidity creation decreasing effect of capital injections based on both models, but no evidence 
of such an effect is found for regulatory interventions. One possible explanation for the latter 
may be that several of these interventions are restructuring orders that relate to instructions to 
restructure business processes. Due to their greater resources and flexibility in terms of busi-
ness models, larger banks may be better able to accommodate such restrictions.   
5.4. Do the liquidity creation effects differ by bank capitalization? 
Berger and Bouwman (2009a) show that capital is a key determinant for liquidity creation, 
while Berger and Bouwman (2009b) present evidence that banks with higher capital ratios are 
able to increase their market shares of liquidity creation during banking crises. Here, we exam-
ine whether weakly-capitalized banks are affected differently by interventions than better-
capitalized banks. As a cut-off point, we use the median bank’s equity capital ratio (5.14 per-
cent).
[Table 9 Ordered Logit and Partial Proportional Odds Model – Weakly- and Better-
Capitalized Banks]
Panel A in Table 9 shows that the results for weakly-capitalized banks are very similar to 
our main results: interventions are associated with reductions in liquidity creation for these 
banks. The effects are significant, and the results based on capital injections are quantitatively 
similar to our full sample results. The effect of regulatory interventions, however, is greater in 
magnitude: the odds ratio decreases from 0.59 for the full sample to 0.42 for weakly-capitalized 
banks, indicating that the likelihood for an increase in liquidity creation is reduced by 58 per-
cent.
The results for the subsample of banks that operate above the median capital ratio in Panel B 
are very different. Across the ordered logit and partial proportional odds models, we find no 
effect of regulatory interventions on liquidity creation, likely because there is a lesser urgency 
to act for these banks. However, we continue to find a liquidity decreasing effect after capital 
injections, although the t-statistics are smaller.   
                                                           
17   The capital injection effect is significant based on the proportional odds model only. 
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5.5. Do the liquidity creation results differ during crisis vs. non-crisis periods? 
Financial crises raise the question of how effectively banks can be disciplined by regulators 
and private parties alike in episodes of extraordinary distress. Acharya et al. (2007) underscore 
that liquidity provision becomes a crucial issue during crises. Banks that experience distress 
may suffer even greater declines in liquidity creation in a crisis. From a policy perspective, it is 
therefore important to ascertain whether the effects of different forms of interventions are iden-
tical for crisis and non-crisis periods.
[Table 10 Crisis vs. Non-Crisis Years]
Panel A in Table 10 reports the results for the crisis years only (2001, 2007, 2008) and Panel
B performs our analysis for the full sample excluding the non-crisis years. Panel A illustrates 
that during crisis years, regulatory interventions lose their effect on liquidity creation, which is 
consistent with Berger and Bouwman (2010). The evidence for capital injections is weak at 
best. The flexible partial proportional odds model adds information that is obscured in the or-
dered logit model. Capital injections only weakly reduce the likelihood of a decrease in liquid-
ity creation vs. no change or an increase in liquidity creation.  
During non-crisis years in Panel B, we find more support that regulatory interventions and 
capital injections reduce liquidity creation – the odds ratios are significant in all cases.
6. Additional tests 
In this section, we perform three additional tests. We first use alternative cut-offs for the de-
pendent variable to check for robustness. Next, we exclude ‘bad’ banks to ensure that our main 
results are not driven by distressed banks whose liquidity creation would have likely declined 
even absent intervention. Finally, we test the Risk Hypothesis by examining the effect of the 
two types of interventions on risk taking. 
6.1 Alternative cut-offs 
Table 11 shows robustness tests with alternative cut-offs for the dependent variable. In Pan-
el A, the dependent variable takes on the value 1 if there is a drop in liquidity creation by more 
than 1 percent relative to the previous year, it takes on the value 2 if liquidity creation remained 
in a narrow band of +/- 1 percent, and it takes on the value 3 if liquidity increased by more than 
1 percent. Panel B uses 5 percent as a cut-off point.
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Our previous findings remain qualitatively unchanged. We obtain very similar results using 
these two alternative cutoffs.   
 [Table 11 Additional Tests – Alternative Cut-Offs for the Dependent Variables and ‘Bad’ Banks]
6.2 Excluding ‘bad’ banks 
So far, we have presented evidence that regulatory interventions and capital injections are 
associated with declines in liquidity creation. One potential concern is that these results are not 
driven by the effects of interventions on liquidity creation, but simply pick up a ‘bad’ bank ef-
fect. Banks in distress are likely to shrink their loan portfolios, deposit levels, and off-balance 
sheet activities because of their distress. Thus, banks in distress are likely to reduce their liquid-
ity creation even absent intervention. However, these banks are also prime candidates for inter-
ventions. Results from regressing the change in liquidity creation on intervention dummies may 
inadvertently suggest that interventions cause a decline in liquidity creation, even though the 
decline would have also occurred absent intervention. To address this issue, we exclude banks 
that exited the market via forced mergers, where moratoria have been granted, and where the 
bank charter was revoked. By excluding these institutions, we lose 725 observations (7.1 per-
cent of the sample population), but mitigate the effect of detecting spurious correlations be-
tween declines in liquidity creation and the key variables of interest. 
 Table 11, Panel C, shows the results. The ordered logit models and the partial proportional 
odds models support to our earlier findings. Liquidity creation is more likely to decline after 
regulatory interventions and capital injections in this smaller sample than in the full sample 
Thus, the main results do not seem to be driven by a ‘bad’ bank effect.
6.3 The effect of regulatory interventions and capital injections on bank risk taking 
Our focus so far has been on the effect of interventions by regulators and bankers associa-
tions on liquidity creation. The findings suggest that liquidity creation declines following such 
interventions. Since regulators and bankers associations care about the safety and soundness of 
the banking system, it is critical to verify if their interventions are effective in reducing risk 
(Risk Hypothesis).
To address this, we focus our attention on the total risk-based capital ratio, defined as tier 1 
plus tier 2 capital divided by risk-weighted assets, since this is a key measure of bank risk-
taking regulators use. We also examine what happens to the nonperforming loans ratio, the risk 
measure used as control variable in our main regressions.   
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Specifically, we replace the dependent variable of our main regressions with the change in 
risk using the two alternative risk measures. In case of the total risk-based capital ratio, the de-
pendent variable takes on the value 1 if the ratio increases by more than 3 percent relative to the 
previous period, it takes on the value 2, if it remains within the interval -3 to +3 percentage, and 
it takes on the value 3 if it decreased by more than 3 percent. We use a similar coding for the 
ratio of nonperforming loans. We use the same set of variables on the right hand side of the 
equation as in our main regression, but omit the equity ratio in Panel A of Table 12, and non-
performing loans in Panel B.
While regulatory interventions have no effect on the total risk-based capital ratio in Table 
12, Panel A shows that capital injections have the desired outcome. Injecting capital raises the 
probability for an increase in total risk-based capital by at least 29 percent in the ordered logit 
model. Panel B demonstrates that the effect of different interventions is stronger for credit risk. 
Regulatory interventions and capital injections reduce probabilities for increases in nonper-
forming loans by 44 and 26 percent, respectively. In short, our results generally support the 
Risk Hypothesis.
 [Table 12 Ordered Logit and Partial Proportional Odds Model – Risk Measures]
7. Long-run effects of interventions 
The results so far suggest that interventions in one year are associated with reductions in li-
quidity creation and reductions in risk in the following year. We now focus on the long-run 
effects of interventions.
In particular, we examine the long-run impact of those measures on banks’ liquidity creation 
market share and on risk taking relative to the industry. We in effect control for the industry 
changes in both measures to take out the effects of any long-run secular trends. To illustrate, 
suppose liquidity creation increases by 2 percent over the five years after the intervention while 
the industry’s liquidity creation goes up by 10 percent. If we did not control for the industry 
change, we would incorrectly conclude that the long-run effect of the intervention was positive. 
By focusing on liquidity creation market shares, we correctly conclude that the long-run effect 
is negative because the bank’s market share has gone down.  
Liquidity creation market share is defined as liquidity created by a bank relative to liquidity 
created by the entire banking sector. To account for the fact that a bank’s liquidity creation 
market share is negative if it destroys liquidity, we focus on the percentile rank of each bank’s 
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market share instead of its market share per se. Risk is measured as the riskiness of a bank rela-
tive to the riskiness of the entire banking sector. We use the two risk proxies used above for 
this purpose.
For our illustration in Table 13, we focus on banks with repeated events of regulatory inter-
ventions or capital injections.  
 [Table 13 Long-Run Effects]
Panel A uses the percentile rank of the bank’s market share on the national level. The results 
show that the median banks’ market share declines over the five years after the interventions. 
For instance, the rank of the median bank drops from 51.20 in the year of regulatory interven-
tions (48.95 for capital injections) to 46.20 five years later (40.50 in case of capital injections), 
indicating a considerable shrinking of activities relative to other institutions. In case of regula-
tory interventions, these results seem to be driven by cooperatives rather than public and pri-
vate banks. Whereas cooperative banks are fairly limited in terms of geographic reach and in 
terms of scope of activities, public and private banks may be able to adapt to the limitations 
imposed by regulators more quickly and resume liquidity creation at higher levels.
18  The capi-
tal injection results seem to be driven by cooperative banks and public banks.  When the sam-
ple is split into small and large banks, we find that long-run market shares go down for both 
size classes.   
The results in Panel B suggest that over the five years after regulatory interventions, the per-
centile rank of the total risk-based capital ratios of banks declines (with the exception of public 
banks). Over the five years after capital injections, total risk-based capital ratios increase.  
The focus on the percentile ranks of nonperforming loans in Panel C provides strong and 
consistent support for the Risk Hypothesis. For all types of banks as well as for the subsamples 
of small and large banks we find that both types of disciplining events reduce bank risk over 
the 5 year period following regulatory interventions and capital injections. 
                                                           
18  In unreported tests, we exclude large private banks, Landesbanks, and central cooperatives to constrain the 
calculation of the percentile rank of liquidity creation market shares to banks that operate in geographically de-
limited areas (small private banks, savings banks, and cooperative banks). That is, the denominator of the li-
quidity creation market share omits the large institutions that operate across different regions to compute re-
gional market shares. The goal is to obtain an even ‘cleaner’ test of the effects on liquidity creation market 
shares. We find that liquidity provision in the local economies may be substantially affected when regulatory 
interventions and capital injections take place in banking markets that are dominated by these small banks 
whose business models emphasize close proximity to their customers. 
23 
In sum, the findings from the analysis of long-run effects suggest that over the five years af-
ter the actions taken by regulators and bankers associations both liquidity creation market 
shares and bank risk taking (relative to the industry) go down.
8. Concluding remarks 
In this paper, we formulate and test three hypotheses related to how regulatory interventions 
and capital injections affect bank liquidity creation and risk taking. Since the creation of liquid-
ity is one of the key reasons why banks exist, and regulators care about risk taking, these issues 
are of first-order importance for bank regulators, policy makers, and researchers.  
We document several important empirical regularities using recently-developed measures of 
bank liquidity creation and exploiting a unique dataset of German universal banks. The results 
are generally consistent with our hypotheses. 
First, liquidity creation decreases after regulatory interventions and capital injections. Sec-
ond, bank risk taking also tends to decrease after these two types of interventions. Specifically, 
non-performing loans decline after both types of interventions and total risk-based capital in-
creases after capital injections. Third, banks’ liquidity creation market shares and bank risk 
taking (relative to the industry) decline over the five years after the interventions.  
24 
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